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I. INTRODUCTION
The international community is presently in a period of
transformation, particularly in the economic and legal spheres.
The New World order, unburdened by the Cold War, is
witnessing unprecedented growth in international trade and
foreign investment. Globalization is imposing intense, economic
internationalization through both the World Trade Organization
and regional integration efforts like MERCOSUL, NAFTA and
the European Union. This internationalization has greatly
changed the concept of national sovereignty.
Regulation of cooperation and interaction among nations
require the creation of new systems of equitable and functional
rules. Because of recent economic integration efforts, we are in
the process of developing an entire body of integration law. The
European Community, which is close to true political and
monetary union, is a useful foil to study the institutional model
adopted by MERCOSUL. The more developed European model
provides important lessons about the kinds of instruments and
rules needed for economic and political integration and enables
us to focus more critically on MERCOSUL's problems.
MERCOSUL, the Common Market of the South, was created
by the Treaty of Asuncion, signed by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay
and Uruguay on March 26, 1991.' MERCOSUL is a democratic
reference mark for countries integrating in order to become part
of the post-Cold War world of indefinite polarities.! Although
many have argued that MERCOSUL should adopt the European
model for institutional and jurisdictional integration, that model

1. See THOMAS A. OIKEEFE, LATIN AMERICAN TRADE AGREEMENTS A5:1 A5:15 (1997); Treaty Establishing A Common Market, Mar. 26, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 10411063, for the English translation of the text of the Treaty of Asuncion. See CODIGO DO
MERCOSUL 17-43 (Nadia de Araujo, Frederico Magalhies Marques & Marcio Monteiro
Reis eds., 1998)[hereinafter CODIGO DO MERCOSUL].
2. Celso Lafer, Sentido Estrat~gico do Mercosul, in MERCOSUL: DESAFIOS A
VENCER 9 (1994).
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was decisively rejected in the Protocol of Ouro Preto.' Instead,
for
its own model
MERCOSUL chose to develop
intergovernmental organization. Since that die has already been
cast, there is no point in rehashing the debates about which
model MERCOSUL should have followed.
The purpose of this article is much simpler: to analyze from
a Brazilian perspective MERCOSUL's experience with dispute
resolution. In order to do this, I must set out certain conceptual
aspects, discussed in sections II and III, in order to deal with the
theme of dispute resolution in section IV.
Section IV analyzes three distinct methods of dispute
resolution that may be utilized separately, simultaneously, or
sequentially in MERCOSUL. The first is consultation through
MERCOSUL's Trade Commission (CCM). The second is ordinary
litigation in national courts, utilizing the array of judicial
assistance measures available under the Protocol of Las Lefias.
The third is binding arbitration.
This study demonstrates that mechanisms already exist to
deal with disputes arising in MERCOSUL. These mechanisms
are capable of resolving disputes not only between States, but
also between private parties or between a State and a private
party.
II. THE MODEL OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW
The purpose of European Community Law is to study
treaties constituting the European Community, as well as
legal evolution resulting from its regulations and the case
applying provisions of these treaties.5 Community Law

the
the
law
has

3. Signed at Ouro Preto, Brazil, Dec. 17, 1994. See O'KEEFE, supra note 1, at
A10:1-A10: 13; Additional Protocol to the Treaty of Asuncion on the Institutional Structure
of MERCOSUR, Dec. 17, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 1244, for the English language text. See
CODIGO DO MERCOSUL, supranote 1, at 55-75, for the Portuguese text.
4. Protocol of Jurisdictional Cooperation and Assistance in Civil Commercial, Labor
and Administrative Matters, Dec. 5, 1992, MERCOSUL, CMC, promulgated in Brazil by
Decree 2.067 on Nov. 12, 1996. See CODIGO DO MERCOSUL, supra note 1, at 107-120,
for the full Portuguese text.
EUROP91A
E SEU
5. PAULO BORBA CASELLA, COMMUNIDADE
ORDENAMENTO JURIDICO 247 (1994). See ANTONIO TIZZANO, CODIGO DA
UNIAO EUROPPIA (1997), for the text of the Treaty of Rome and Community
Legislation. See LOUIS DUBOUIS and GUEYDAN, GRANDS TEXTES DE DROIT
COMMUNAUTAIRE ET DE LUNION EUROP]ENNE (4th ed. 1996Xcontaining
principal examples of European case law with respect to the themes of Community Law);
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become an integral part of the domestic law of the Member
States, transforming their legal systems.
Thus, European
Community Law is both national and international law.6
This new, complex body of transnational law is integrated at
the normative, domestic level of the Member States. Its rules are
binding on all. Reception is automatic, with no need for prior
ratification. The Communities legal system is founded on legal
principles limiting the actions of its administrators.7 These
principles guarantee citizens the protection of rights established
in Community Law.' The heart of Community Law is a set of
rules prohibiting the creation or maintenance of trade barriers
among the Member States. This goal is a priority of the famous
"four liberties": goods, persons, services and capital.' No Member
State may restrict movement of these factors of production across
its borders, assuring development of a market governed by
considerations of demand and efficiency rather than by barriers
artificially created by national borders.
The European Community is a union of States with a legal
order characterized by supranationality. It lies somewhere
between the traditional Nation-State and an international
organization.
Supranationality signifies that the European
Community is a special organization, with its own sovereign
rights, supported by a legal order independent of its Member
States, to which they are submitted. ° Among the many attempts
JEAN BOULOIUS and ROGER-MICHEL CHEVALLIER, GRANDS ARRtTS DE LA
COUR DE JUSTICE DES COMMUNAUTPS EUROPENNES (4th ed. 1997).
6. Ant6nio Boggiano, Hacia el Desarollo Comunitario del Mercosur desde la
Experiencia de la Uni6n Europea, in 0 MERCOSUL E A UNIAO EUROPAIA 49 (1994).
7. According to Deisy Ventura, the European Community has generated a sui
generis type of law through the creation of an original community. A ORDEM JURIDICA
DO MERCOSUL 226 (Deisy Ventura ed., 1996).
8. David Stoelting, an American jurist, has described European Community Law
as: "A florescent body of commercial law in the communitarian ambiance, applicable, in
the limits of the Community, by a multiplicity of national judiciaries as well as by the
institutions of the European Union." David Stoelting, The JurisdictionalFramework of
the European Court of Justice, 29 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'"L L. 194 (1991). See generally,
Ami Barav, Recepqdo da Regra de Direito Comunitdrio Pelas Ordens JuridicasNacionais,
in DIREITO COMUNITARIO DO MERCOSUL (Deisy Ventura ed., 1997); STEPHEN
WEATHERHILL & PAUL BEAUMONT, EC LAW (2d ed. 1995); PAUL CRAIG &
GRAINNE DE BURCA, EC LAW (1997); BERTHOLD GOLDMAN, ANTOINE LYONCAEN & LOUIS VOGEL, DROIT COMMERCIAL EUROP8EN (5th ed. 1994); JOEL
RIDEAU, DROIT INSTITUCIONAL DE LUNION ET DES COMMUNAUTtS
EUROPItENES (2d ed. 1996).
9. WEATHERHILL & BEAUMONT, supra note 8, at 29-30.
10. A ORDEM JURfDICA DO MERCOSUL, supra note 7, at 28 (declaration of
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to define Community Law, probably the most useful is by Ami
Barav and Christian Philip:
Deprived of the symbols of power that
habitually make up the coercive arsenal of the
State, the Communities have only the law. A
centripetal factor to impose upon the Member
States is the success of the integrational design.
By themselves, they have created their own law.
The Court of Justice uses the expression
'Community of Law.' Hierarchical, this normative
production has taken on specific juridical
It is controlled by the
characteristics.
jurisdictional levels constituted for this purpose.
More than Community Law, we may speak of a
communitarian legal order."
The European Court of Justice assures uniform
interpretation of treaties and other communitarian sources and
acts."2 In the domestic arena, Community Law is applied directly
by courts at all jurisdictional levels of the Member States. Even
though domestic proceedings are generally governed by the
procedural law of the Member States, substantively they may be
governed by both domestic and Community Law. National
tribunals have the obligation to guarantee direct, immediate and
effective protection of rights assured by the Community treaties
Robert Schuman).
11. AMI BARAV & CHRISTIAN PHILIP, DICTIONNAIRE JURIDIQUE DES
COMMUNAUTIkS EUROPItENES (1993).
12. The Court of Justice, regulated by the Treaty of Rome, has been primarily
responsible for the consolidation of a common European space. Its principal function is to
harmonize interpretation of Community Law. It has jurisdiction to decide: (1) actions for
non-performance designed to control the actions of Member States and to secure
performance of their obligations; (2) the recourse of nullity directed against acts of
community organs that have exceeded their powers; (3) the action for omission, also
directed to community organs; and (4) the action for indemnification, in the event that
any community organ has caused unjustifiable damage to a State or an individual. The
jurisdiction of the Court of Justice may be invoked by Member States or by individuals
since the treaties create directly exercisable subjective rights. Any citizen has access to
the European Court. There is also the "prejudicial renvoi," an important device for
making Community Law as effective as possible. Whenever a national judge, deciding an
action brought before its jurisdiction, faces a prejudicial question that involves the
interpretation of a rule of Community Law, he may send this question to the Court of
Justice so that it can render a decision more adequate to communitarian interests. This
renvoi is mandatory when rendering a non-appealable decision. See CARTOU, L'UNION
EUROPPeENNE 83-181 (2d ed. 1996); JEAN BOULOIUS, DROIT INSTITUTIONNEL DE
L'UNION EUROP]ENNE 81-118 (6th ed. 1996).
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and legislation derived therefrom.
Another principle of Community Law is that it prevails over
both international law and the domestic law of Member States.
Over the years the domestic law of the Member States has had to
make a series of adaptations, even at the constitutional level.
Today, Community Law constitutes a new species. Because of its
specificity, it belongs neither to classic international law nor to
international organizations." Instead, jurists have created a new
Law of Economic Integration, which regulates the actions of
economic blocs as they affect the process of economic integration.
III. THE SOURCES OF THE INTEGRATION LAW OF MERCOSUL

Contrary to the European Community, MERCOSUL opted to
create intergovernmental institutions without supranational
character to facilitate and coordinate its integration process. The
highest organ of MERCOSUL is the Council of the Common
Market, also referred to as the Conselho do Mercado Comum
(CMC), which is responsible for the political conduct of the
integration process and for assuring attainment of the objectives
set forth in the Treaty of Asuncion to establish a common
market. It is composed of the Ministers of Foreign Relations and
the Ministers of Economy of the Member States. The actions of
the CMC are taken through decisions.
Immediately below the CMC is the Common Market Group,
also referred to as the Grupo do Mercado Comum (GMC), an
executive body charged with application of the policies and
deliberations of the CMC. It is composed of the Ministers of
Foreign Relations of the Member States. The GMC's powers and
jurisdiction are set out in Article 14 of the Protocol of Ouro Preto,
and the Protocol of Ouro Preto increased the GMC's functions
beyond those described in the Treaty of Asuncion. The GMC's
power of initiative is very broad, and its complementary
functions are the preparation and supervision of the acts of the
CMC. The actions of the GMC are taken through resolutions.14
13.

CASELLA, supra note 5, at 247.

14. The 0MC also works through eleven subgroups (STG), divided by areas of
specific functions. The subgroups are as follows: SGT-1: Commercial Subjects, SGT-2:
Customs Subjects, SGT-3: Technical Rules, SGT-4: Fiscal and Monetary Policies Related
to Trade, SGT-5: Land Transportation, SGT-6: Ocean Transport, SGT-7: Industrial and
Technological Policies, SGT-8; Agricultural Policies, SGT-9: Energy Policy, SGT-10:
Coordination of Macroeconomic Policies, and SGT-11: Labor and Employment Relations
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A third agency of MERCOSUL is the Trade Commission,
also referred to as the Comissdo de Com6rcio (CCM), which acts
as the watchdog of the GMC. Its purpose is to implement the
customs union, formulate common trade policies with respect to
third countries, and to regulate unfair competition. The CCM
implements these policies through directives, which are binding
upon the Member States. It also utilizes its monthly meetings to
analyze the various consultations formulated by the Member
States that fall within its jurisdiction. It has established its own
The CCM has nine
mechanism to facilitate consultations.
technical committees, which are responsible for each area of
jurisdiction.
These committees render present specialized
opinions in cases of consultations and other activities.
A fourth agency of MERCOSUL is the Joint Parliamentary
Commission, also referred to as the Comissdo Parlamentar
Conjunta (CPC), which is the representative body of the
It is charged with
legislatures of the Member States.
accelerating the entry into force of common rules and
harmonization of legislation in the Member States. The CPC is
composed of up to sixty-four parliamentarians, sixteen from each
Member State. It, however, does not have the power to approve
communitarian legislation, because MERCOSUL has not
permitted effective, direct application of supranational rules.
A fifth MERCOSUL agency is the Economic-Social
Consultative, also referred to as the Forum Foro Consultivo
Econ6mico-Social (FCES), which is the representative body of the
economic and social sectors of the Member States. The Protocol
guarantees an equal number of representatives for each Member
Finally,
State. The FCES acts through recommendations.
MERCOSUL has an Administrative Secretariat, created by the
Protocol of Ouro Preto, with headquarters in Montevideo. The
Secretariat's principal function is safeguarding documents and
information on the activities of MERCOSUL. It is presently the
sole permanent body in MERCOSUL with the power to render
operational support and services for the other agencies, as well
as to exercise other purely administrative activities. It has its
own budget and employees and publishes the Official Bulletin of
MERCOSUL.
The new institutional structure for Mercosul created by the
and Social Security.
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Protocol of Ouro Preto preserves the Treaty of Asuncion as the
principal instrument of integration.
It also maintains the
flexibility of the organs of MERCOSUL because of the absence of
supranationality and its intergovernmental characteristics. The
Protocol of Ouro Preto sets out the following sources for the
institutional structure of MERCOSUL: (1) the Treaty of
Asuncion, including its protocols and additional, complementary
instruments; (2) agreements celebrated under the aegis of the
Treaty of Asuncion and their protocols; (3) decisions of the CMC;
(4) resolutions of the GMC; and (5) directives of the CCM."5
MERCOSUL's decisions are taken by consensus, which implies
complex negotiations within the bloc before adoption of any
decision.
These discussions must be carried out prior to
incorporation of any decision into each country's domestic legal
systems.
Even though the Protocol of Ouro Preto makes
MERCOSUL's
rules mandatory, this does not occur
automatically. The European Community model, with direct and
primary applicability of community rules over national rules, was
rejected during the negotiations and has not been revived during
the period of transition. Incorporation of MERCOSUL rules by
the Member States requires explicit adoption in accordance with
their own domestic legal systems.16
Once MERCOSUL has adopted a rule, it must pass through
three additional stages to have binding force. First, it must be
incorporated into the domestic legal order of each State. Second,
this incorporation must be communicated to the Administrative
Secretariat, which in turn must await arrival of appropriate
documentation from all Member States.
Third, the
Administrative Secretariat must transmit the final document of
ratification to the Member States. This document signifies that

15. Deisy Ventura emphasizes that the identification of a legal ordinance in the
international area implies the recognition of its very own sources, which differentiates it
from national orders. This common perception gives rise to the concepts of the
communitarian order. Thus, one classifies the Treaty of Asuncion, the protocols that
complemented it, and the law derived therefrom whose rules emanate from the
autonomous institutions of the bloc as the original law of MERCOSUR. A ORDEM
JURIDICA, supra note 7, at 41-42.
16. See Nadia de Araujo, A Internalizaqdo dos Tratados Internacionaisno Direito
Brasileiro e a Ausncia de Regulamentafdo Constitucional, in 3 REVISTA DA
FACULDADE DE DIREITO DA UFF 77-90 (1999), for an explanation of Brazil's system
for incorporation of treaties and its case law.
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the rule will enter into force simultaneously within thirty days in
the MERCOSUL area.17
In practice, however, Member States have displayed a
number of variations from this rule in incorporating MERCOSUL
provisions into their domestic law. Certain protocols are true
treaties and must be legislatively ratified in order to be
incorporated into domestic law. Others, such as the Protocols of
Las Lefias and Buenos Aires, went into force prior to ratification
by all Member States. For example, even though Uruguay did
not ratify the Protocol of Las Lefias until 1998, the Protocol was
utilized prior to that date several times in Brazil, as will be
discussed infra. Moreover, some MERCOSUL rules require only
a domestic, administrative rule for their adoption, such as a
regulation by the Central Bank. Other rules require no domestic
procedure, such as the internal regulations of the Trade
Commission. Thus, there are two categories of rules: those that
enter into force simultaneously, and others that require domestic
There is no guarantee of uniformity in all
adaptation.
MERCOSUL countries.
The sources of MERCOSUL law lack uniformity."8 If only
one Member State refuses to adopt a MERCOSUL rule, its
adoption is at risk until establishment of the common market.
Article 42 of the Protocol of Ouro Preto provides that the rules
emanating from MERCOSUL have an international character
but are only transformed into domestic rules through a special
act of reception or incorporation.
Francisco Rezek, a Brazilian judge on the International
Court of Justice, points out that incorporation of the law of
MERCOSUL into domestic law continues to be done in the classic
manner of international treaties. Incorporation must include
negotiation by governments and ratification by national
legislatures. Thus, MERCOSUL law enters into force only after
promulgation by national executives, which is typical for

17. See A ORDEM JURDICA, supra note 7, at 61, for an explanation of why this
occurs. The delegations at the Ouro Preto meeting justified this result because of
constitutional limitations in various Member States. Brazil, in particular, was in a
delicate situation, because its 1988 Constitution constitutes the greatest obstacle to
adoption of the European model. A detailed analysis of the constitutional situation of
each of the Member States is set out in A ORDEM JURIDICA.
18. Werter T. Faria, Aplica~do Interna das Normas Emanadas dis 6rganos do
MERCOSUL, in 1 TEMAS DE INTEGRAQAO 15 (1996).
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reception of international acts.1"
In a technical sense,
MERCOSUL rules may not be denominated Community Law, for
they lack hierarchical superiority; automatic reception by
domestic, legal orders; and auto-applicability. 0
The barriers to domestic applicability of MERCOSUL rules
were graphically illustrated by a recent decision of the Brazilian
Supreme Court.
The case involved an attempt to utilize
MERCOSUL's Protocol of Provisional Measures, which had been
ratified by Brazil, to implement a rogatory letter in Brazil.
Nevertheless, the Brazilian Supreme Court decided that the
Protocol was not in force in Brazil because no decree
promulgating it had been published. In his opinion, Minister
Celso de Mello explained that in order for international treaties
and conventions to enter into force in Brazil, they must be
approved by Congress and subsequently promulgated by
presidential decree. Since the final stage had not yet occurred,
the Protocol could not be utilized in Brazil. At no time did the
Supreme Court consider the rules of the Protocol of Ouro Preto
dealing with the entry into force within the MERCOSUL
community of the Protocol in question.2'
Brazil has no hierarchy between laws and treaties. If there
is a conflict between domestic law and MERCOSUL, Brazilian
courts apply the rule that the latter in time prevails. If a more
recent law is inconsistent with a treaty, the law will prevail, even
though this may mean invalidating a treaty and a consequent

19. Francisco Rezek, Conference, DIREITO COMUNITARIO DO MERCOSUL 55
(Deisy Ventura ed., 1997). See Nadia de Araujo et al, Resumos de Jurisprudenciado STF
e STJ sobre Conflicto de Fontes, in 3 CADERNOS DA PUC-RIO 11 (1997), for a summary
of the cases in which the STF or the STJ have dealt with conflicts between the treaty and
the law.
20. Horgcio Wanderlei Rodrigues, Mercosul: Alguns Conceitos Bdsicos Necessdrios e
sua Compreensdo, in SOLUCAO DE CONTROVERSIAS NO MERCOSUL 29 (1997)
(classifying MERCOSUL rules as Cooperative Law).
21. Rogatory Letter 8.279, Argentina, Minister Celso de Mello, President. The
headnote of the case states: "The Protocol of Provisional Measures, adopted by the Council
of the Common Market at its seventh meeting in Ouro Preto/MG in December 1994, even
though approved by the Congress (Legislative Decree No. 192/95), is not formally
incorporated into the system of domestic positive law in force in Brazil. Despite having
been ratified (instrument of ratification deposited on 3/18/97), it has not yet been
promulgated through a decree by the President of the Republic. Doctrinal and case law
considerations involving the question of the ability to execute international conventions of
treaties in the area of domestic Brazilian law. Precedents: 58 RTJ 70, Reporter Min.
Oswaldo Trigueiro - ADI No. 1.480-DF, Reporter Minister Celso do Mello."
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violation of international law.2 2 Although this is of some concern,
the Supreme Court believes the last word of Congress should
prevail.
IV. DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Economic integration requires more than mere suppression
of tariff barriers. It also requires creation of a new and adequate
legal order with fully functional common rules in the domestic
laws of the Member States.
Mere technical rules are not
sufficient. What is required is an increase in the levels of
association among the MERCOSUL countries. Traditional legal
standards need to be restructured, especially with respect to the
definition of sovereignty of the Member States and their exercise
of jurisdiction. 2
Thus far, MERCOSUL has opted for an integration model
without supranational institutions. This has been a critical
failure, particularly because a permanent court along the lines of
the European Court of Justice is sorely needed."
Only a
supranational tribunal can resolve two fundamental questions
for full implementation of the Treaty of Asuncion: control of the
legality of the acts of communitarian bodies and Member States,
and the uniform interpretation of Community Law. Creation of
such a court would require an amendment to the Brazilian
Constitution.
Even though Brazil has adopted thirty-six
amendments to its 1988 Constitution, none of the proposed
amendments to permit creation of a supranational court has been
adopted.25
This, however, does not signify any lack of litigation or

22. Rezek, supra note 19, at 56.
23. PAULO BORBA CASELLA, COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO COMPETITION
LAW IN THE E.C. AND THE MERCOSUL 39 (1993).
24. A consensus exists that the solution ought to be the creation of a supranational
tribunal along the lines of the European Court of Justice or Andean Tribunal of Justice.
See Vincente Marotta Rangel, Solugdo Pacifica de Controversias no Mercosul, in
CONTRATOS INTERNACIONAIS E DIREITO ECONOMICO NO MERCOSUL (Paulo
Borba Casella ed., 1996); CASELLA, supra note 23; Werter Faria, EstruturaInstitucional
de Comunidades e Mercados Comuns, 6 BOLETIM DE INTEGRAQAO LATINOAMERICANA (1992); Maristela Basso, A Estrutura Institucional Definitiva do Mercosul,
10 BOLETIM DE INTEGRA,AO LATINO-AMERICANA (1993).
25. Currently, a constitutional amendment to reform the Judiciary is moving
towards adoption in Congress, but no mention of MERCOSUL's institutions appears in
the proposed amendment.
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disputes in MERCOSUL. There are several mechanisms that
can be utilized directly for dispute resolution in MERCOSUL.
These mechanisms coexist simultaneously in MERCOSUL
institutions, as well as in the legal systems of the Member
States .2

a. Dispute Resolution Measures within MERCOSUL
The Treaty of Asuncion, in Annex III, Article 3, adopted a
two-step dispute resolution system. The first step describes
If
direct negotiations under the auspices of the GMC.
negotiations fail, the second step includes binding arbitration.
Three types of disputes are subject to resolution under
MERCOSUL: (1) those arising among Member States; (2) those
between a Member State and a private party; and (3) those
involving only private parties, whether individuals or legal
entities, provided they are either domiciled or have their
headquarters located within a Member State.
The Protocol of Brasilia for the Resolution of Controversies of
December 12, 1991, which went into effect in April 1993, deals
only with disputes between Member States, also referred to as
government-to-government, and those between private parties
The
and .a Member State, referred to as private-government.
Protocol establishes a three-stage process for resolution of
government-to-government disputes: (1) direct negotiations for a
maximum period of fifteen days after request; (2) intervention by
the Common Market Group, which must issue its
recommendation within thirty days after presentation of the
dispute to it; and (3) arbitration before a panel of three, chosen
from a list of ten previously submitted by each Member State to
26. Guido Soares, As Instituiq6es.do Mercosul e as Solugoes dos Litigios no seu
Ambito - Sugest~es de Lege Ferenda, in MERCOSUL: DAS NEGOCIAQOES A
IMPLANTA(JAO 262-319 (Olavo Batista et al. eds., 1994); Eduardo Grebler, 0 Mercosul
Institucional e a Solugdo de Controvdrsias, 12 BOLETIM DE INTEGRAQAO LATINOAMERICANA (1994). See also LUIS FERNANDO FRANCESCHINI DA ROSA,
MERCOSUL E A FUNQJAO JURISDLCIONAL (1997).
27. The Protocol was ratified by Brazil on September 14, 1993, and published in the
Official Gazette on September 15, 1993. MERCOSUR: Protocol of Brasilia for The
Settlement Of Disputes, Dec. 17, 1991, 36 I.L.M 691 (1997) (English translation). See
CODIGO DO MERCOSUL, supra note 1, at 44. See LUIS OLAVO BAPTISTA, 0
MERCOSUL: SUAS INSTITUTIQOES E ORDENAMENTO JURIDICO (1998), for
dispute resolution and the Protocol of Brasilia. The author is one of the defenders of a
permanent arbitral court along the lines that Europe had at the time of Benelux.
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the Administrative Secretariat."
Any individual or legal entity, domiciled or whose
headquarters are located in one of the Member States and is
adversely affected by a legal or administrative measure of
another Member State that allegedly violates a MERCOSUL
treaty or accord, can formulate a complaint with its own national
section of the Common Market Group. If it decides to accept the
claim, the national section either tries to resolve the complaint
with its counterpart of the Member State that allegedly
committed the violation or else transmits the complaint directly
to the entire Common Market Group. The full GMC must also
decide whether to accept or dismiss the complaint. If it decides
to accept it, the GMC appoints a panel of experts, chosen from a
list of twenty-four experts whose names were previously
submitted by the Member States to the Administrative
Secretariat. If the GMC accepts the recommendation of the
experts, the Member State whose national section espoused the
complaint can demand that the offending State remedy the
violation within fifteen days. If the offending State fails to do so,
the offended State, not the private complainant may seek binding
arbitration.2 9
These rules are maintained by the Protocol of Ouro Preto of
December 17, 1994. 30
This Protocol granted the Trade
Commission greater participation, giving it jurisdiction to hear
complaints by the Member States, especially in the areas of
competition and commercial disputes. The procedure for dispute
resolution of MERCOSUL at the government-to-government level
involves the following institutions: the Trade Commission, the
Common Market Group and its advisory organ.
All subsequent Protocols dealing with the institutions of
MERCOSUL have contained a chapter relating to their
interpretation and to the solution of controversies arising from

28. Each party chooses one arbitrator from its list of ten. The third arbitrator, who
cannot be a national of any party to the dispute, is selected by mutual consent. If the
parties cannot agree, the third arbitrator is chosen by lottery by the Administrative
Secretariat from a list of sixteen drawn up by the Common Market Group. O'KEEFE,
supra note 1, at 7:5, 7:9.
29. Id. at 7:11-7:12.
30. This Protocol went into effect in January 1996. Additional Protocol to the
Treaty of Asuncion on the Institutional Structure of MERCOSUR, supra note 3 (English
version); CODIGO DO MERCOSUL, supra note 1, at 55 (Portuguese text).
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them. All refer back to the solution of the Protocol of Brasilia. 1
The Trade Commission, created in 1995, has become the
privileged forum for the prompt treatment of commercial
questions, especially those relating to competition. 2 The Trade
Commission receives consultations about commercial matters,
and the clarifications presented at its meetings have produced
satisfactory results in numerous cases.
The procedure before the Trade Commission is to formulate
consultations, which are presented either in ordinary or
extraordinary meetings. The Commission has established a
consultation formula that includes the description of the
problem, the relevant provisions of MERCOSUL, and the relief
requested to resolve the problem."4 A technical note from the
country sponsoring the consultation must accompany the
formula. The consulted State must respond in writing at the
next meeting of the CCM. If there are no deliberations, the
question is sent to the Technical Committee, which must decide
by consensus. If there is no consensus, the question is sent to the
Common Market Group, which must issue an opinion within
thirty days.
The Trade Commission's consultation process is simple and
The procedure has three phases: (1) direct
democratic."
31. See, e.g., C6DIGO DO MERCOSUL, supra note 1, at 205. The following article
from the Protocol is repeated literally in numerous other texts:
Article 8:
Dispute Resolution among the Contracting Parties
Disputes that arise among the contracting parties with respect to the
interpretation or application of this Protocol shall be submitted to the
dispute resolution proceedings established by the Protocol of Brasflia
for Dispute Resolution of December 17, 1991, hereinafter denominated
"Protocol of Brasflia," or to the system that is eventually established in
its place under the aegis of the Treaty of Asuncion.
32. The CCM's first meeting approving its internal regulations was in October 1995,
in Rio de Janeiro. See 15 BOLETIM DE INTEGRACAO 141-143, for the text thereof. By
the second semester of 1998, twenty-seven ordinary meetings had taken place. This
means that the CCM has met more or less every two months. The consultations and
responses to them are published in the Bulletin of Latin American Integration, published
by the Ministry of Foreign Relations. In Brazil this publication is regarded as the official
channel of information about MERCOSUL.
33. Jos6 Botafogo Gon~alves, A Consolidoqdo do Mercosul: 0 Primeiro Ano de
Viggncia da Unido Aduaneira, 17 BULETIM DE INTEGRA,AO LATINO-AMERICANA 8
(1995).
34. Directive 13 (1995). See 18 BOLETIM DE INTEGRAQAO 124-125 (1996), for
the text of this directive; CODIGO DO MERCOSUL, supranote 1.
35. See Jos6 Botafogo Gongalves, Os Tribunais do Mercosul, 18 BOLETIM DE
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negotiations through consultations in the Commission; (2)
intervention by the executive body of MERCOSUL through a
decision on the complaint in the Common Market Group; and (3)
binding arbitration through an ad hoc tribunal. Use of the
consultation mechanism does not prevent later utilization of
other dispute resolution mechanisms provided for in the Protocol
de Brasilia.
The system of dispute resolution carried out by the Trade
Commission is non-binding, depending upon the will of the
parties. It is quite similar to the consultation mechanism of the
World Trade Organization, albeit in simplified form. 6
In 1999 and 2000, three arbitral awards have been rendered
under the Brasilia Protocol's system of ad hoc arbitration.7
Although each Tribunal had a different set of arbitrators, both
the second and third awards quoted extensively from the first
award, which shows development of an embryonic case law. All
three panels reaffirmed the need to look at the Treaty's
INTEGRAQAO LATINO-AMERICANA 6 (1996).
36. All members of MERCOSUL are signatories to the World Trade Organization
(WTO) and therefore have tried to create rules compatible with the legislation already in
force in that organization. The obligation to consult was part of the tradition of GATT
and was continued by the WTO. According to Prosper Weil, in international economic
law, consultation is a technique as much in the elaboration as it is in the application of
rules, creating legal standards rather than rigid classifications of conduct. Consultations
are an opportunity for fact finding. They are a structured form of joint inquiry that can
lead to conciliation of interests. The practice of the GATT in these matters, which has
been continued by the WTO, obeys the logic of peaceful, dispute resolution, taking into
account the specificity of the economic contentions. Celso Lafer, A OMC E A
REGULAMENTAVAO DO COM]tRCIO INTERNACIONAL: UMA VISAO BRASILEIRA
112 (1998).
37. The first case of arbitral decision under MERCOSUL, Argentina v. Brazil, dealt
with the application of "Comuniques Nos. 37/97 e 7198" of Brazil's Department of Foreign
Commerce (DECEX), of the Secretariat of Foreign Commerce (SECEX). Argentina
contended that these Brazilian rules interfered with free trade protected by the Treaty of
Asuncion. The final award, rendered April 28, 1999, held that Brazil had to adapt some of
its rules to the treaty obligations until the end of 1999. The award was promptly
complied with. The second arbitration, also Argentina v. Brazil, concerned Brazilian
subsidies for the exportation of pork. The final award, rendered on September 27, 1999,
declared that the Brazilian PROEX Program had to halt these subsidies. On the other
hand, the Arbitral Tribunal upheld two other challenged Brazilian programs (ACC and
ACE).
The third arbitration between Brazil and Argentina involved the legality of Resolution
No. 861/99 of the Ministry of Economy of Argentina, which applied safeguard measures to
textile imports coming from Brazil. In the final award, rendered on March 10, 2000, the
Tribunal found that the Argentine Resolution was inconsistent with the Treaty provisions
and, therefore, should be revoked. The awards will soon be published by the Mercosur
Official Bulletim.
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principles as a whole and take into consideration the aims of
Small
MERCOSUL, mainly the integration process.
under
provisions
about
the
inconsistencies and technicalities
discussion were viewed in light of the bigger picture,
preservation of the integration process.
b. Litigation in the Courts of the Member States
The domestic legal systems of the Party States are an
important forum for resolution of MERCOSUL disputes.
Complaints involving application of integration law can be filed
in the courts of one of the Member States. MERCOSUL rules,
once ratified and promulgated, are an integral part of the
domestic legal order. None of the members of MERCOSUL
restrict access to justice by non-nationals. Unfortunately, there
is no mechanism to ensure uniformity of pronouncements on
MERCOSUL law in the courts of the Member States.
Numerous MERCOSUL protocols deal specifically with legal
procedures. These protocols, which have been neither abrogated
nor replaced by the Protocol of Brasilia, facilitate use of national
courts, especially for transnational litigation. Among the most
important of these protocols is the Protocol for Cooperation and
Jurisdictional Assistance in Civil, Commercial, Labor and
Administrative Matters, known as the Protocol of Las Lefias.3 s
Two other important measures are the Protocol of Buenos Aires
on International Jurisdiction in disputes relating to contracts39
38. Ratified and promulgated in Brazil by Decree No. 2067 on November 12, 1996.
39. MERCOSUR: Protocol of Buenos Aires on International Jurisdiction In Disputes
Relating To Contracts, Aug. 5, 1994, 36 I.L.M. 1263 (1997) (English version); CODIGO
DO MERCOSUL, supra note 1, at 147 (Portuguese version) [hereinafter International
Jurisdiction]. This Protocol, signed in Buenos Aires on August 5, 1994, specifically
permits the parties to an international contract to select a forum. The forum selection
clause must be in writing. It, however, can be made after the date of the contract, or even
after the dispute has arisen. International Jurisdiction, arts. 4,5, supra note 39, at 1267.
Forum selection clauses obtained abusively are invalid. Id.
The Protocol permits extension of jurisdiction after the filing of the complaint if the
defendant affirmatively submits to the jurisdiction in a non-fictitious fashion. This means
that jurisdiction may be extended if the defendant appears without questioning
jurisdiction, but not if the defendant is simply declared in default. International
Jurisdiction, art. 6, supra note 39, at 1268.
The Protocol of Buenos Aires applies not only when both parties are domiciled in States
that are parties to MERCOSUL, but also if only one party is domiciled in a Member State.
However, the parties must have agreed upon the jurisdiction of a State that is a party to
MERCOSUL. International Jurisdiction, art. 1, supra note 39, at 1266.
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and the Protocol on Provisional Measures, both of which have
been incorporated into the domestic law of Brazil. 40
One must differentiate between application by a national
judge of MERCOSUL Community Law and general transnational
litigation unrelated to Community Law. A typical example of a
MERCOSUL dispute involves whether collection of a particular
customs duty conformed to the limits imposed by the Common
External Tariff (CET) for the MERCOSUL bloc. This case could
have been resolved either by the MERCOSUL system for
institutional dispute resolution or by a suit before a national
court to force a governmental authority to carry out a duty
imposed by Community Law. Therefore, the Protocol of Las
Lefias does not need to be utilized. Recently a Brazilian Federal
Judge in Rio Grande do Sul denied a motion by rice farmers to
halt importation of rice coming from Uruguay and Argentina on
the ground that the price represented an unfair trade practice.
The motion was initially denied, but this decision was reversed
by the Appellate Court for the 4th Region. President Costa Leite
of the Superior Tribunal of Justice, however, revoked the
Appellate Court's granting of the motion on the grounds that it
interfered with Brazil's Mercosul Treaty obligations. 1
A typical example of a general transnational dispute involves
a Brazilian and an Argentine company concerning performance
of an international sales contract. The Argentine company files
suit against the Brazilian company in Argentina. In order to
serve the defendant in Brazil, the Argentine plaintiff asks the
court to send a rogatory letter requesting judicial assistance from
the court where the defendant is located. Additionally, suppose a

If there is no agreement between the parties, the Protocol of Buenos Aires may not be
applied to determine international jurisdiction in contractual matters between persons
domiciled in MERCOSUL countries and persons domiciled in third countries. Id. This
implies that one must adhere to the rules of international jurisdiction found domestically
in each one of the countries.
On the other hand, the Protocol of Buenos Aires does not apply to labor contracts,
contracts involving sales to consumers, transportation contracts, insurance contracts, nor
to agreements celebrated in the areas of creditors' arrangements in bankruptcy, family
law, inheritance, social security, real property rights, or administrative contracts.
International Jurisdiction, art. 2, supra note 39, at 1266-1267.
40. Executive Decree No. 2.626, June 14, 1998, D.O. June 16, 1998.
41. Agravo Regimental No. 2000.04.01.034280-1RS, Tribunal Federal, 4th Region,
Reporter: Silvia Goraieb (April 25, 2000) (preliminary injunction conceded), rev'd, Petition
No. 1273/RS, Registry No. 2000/0040618-0 (June 8, 2000) (reversed by President of the
STJ, Costa Leite, at the request of the Federal Government).
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decision rendered in Argentina that has been executed in Brazil,
or suppose a Brazilian court needs information with respect to
foreign law.42 In all three cases, the provisions of the Protocol of
Las Lefias apply. Yet the issues may have nothing to do with
Community Law. This is not the case, however, in a suit
contesting the application of the CET.43
The Protocol of Las Lefias contains various measures to
Thus,
facilitate litigation between MERCOSUL countries.
Article 3 guarantees access to justice; Article 4 prohibits the
requirement of a bond for litigants residing in another Member
42. No foreign judgment is effective in Brazil without homologation by the Brazilian
Supreme Court. See Petigfio Avulsa No. 11, Reporter: Minister Celso de Mello, President,
with the following headnote:
Foreign Judgment of Divorce. Request for confirmation of this
judgment directed to a state magistrate, alleging the lack of necessity
for prior homologation in view of Article 15, sole paragraph of
a
foreign
of
for
homologation
LICC.. Action
judgment.. .Indispensability of prior homologation of any foreign
judgment whatever be the effects postulated by the interested party.
It is important to emphasize with respect to all of these matters that regional
international conventions promoted by the OAS through Specialized Conferences in
Private International Law are also in force in Brazil. See INTEGRAQAO JURIDICA
AS CONVENQOES INTERAMERICANAS DE DIREITO
INTERAMERICANA:
INTERNACIONAL PRIVADO (CIDIPS) E 0 DIREITO BRASILEIRO (Nadia Araujo &
JURIDICA
INTEGRACAO
1998)
[hereinafter
Casella eds.,
Paulo Borda
INTERAMERICANA], for the original text of these conventions, the extent to which they
are in force in Brazil, and an analysis of their impact upon the domestic legal order. In
the above cited volume see Nadia Araujo, A Convenqdo Interamericana sobre Cartas
Rogat6riase as Conseqllnciasde sua Adoqdo parao Brasil; Ricardo Ramalho Almeida, A
Convengdo sobre Obtendo de Provas no Exterior e a Convengdo lnteramericanasobre
Provae Informa do do DireitoEstrangeiro;Lfgia Maura Costa, Convencdo Interamericana
sobre Compet~ncia na Esfera Internacionalpara Eficdcia Extraterritorialdes Sentenfas
Estrangeiras,for Inter-American conventions with themes dealt with by the Protocol de
Las Lefias.
43. In Europe, these questions were regulated by the Brussels' Convention on
Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters of
September 27, 1968. The ultimate version is dated Nov. 29, 1996, with the affiliation of
Austria, Finland and Switzerland. Besides being broader than the Protocol signed under
MERCOSUL, the Brussels' Convention is subject to prejudicial renvoi by the Tribunal of
Justice of the European Community. See Julio D. Gonzalez Campos & Jose Carlos
Fernandez Rozas, Derecho Internacional Privado Espanol, Textos Y Materiales, in
DERECHO JUDICIAL INTERNATIONAL 136-164 (2d ed. 1992); PIERRE GOTHOT &
DOMINIQUE HOLLEAUX, LA CONVENCION DE BRUSELAS DEL 27 DE
SEPTIEMBRE DE 1968 (1986) (translation of the 1985 French edition); MICHAEL
BOGDAN, THE BRUSSELS JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT CONVENTION
(1996); ALFONSO-LUIS CALVO CARAVACA, COMENTARIO AL CONVENIO DE
BRUSELAS RELATIVO A LA COMPETENCIA JUDICIAL Y A LA EJECUCION DE
RESOLUCIONES JUDICIALES EN MATERIA CIVIL Y MERCANTIL (1994); Maria
Blanca Nodt Taquela, Mercosur-Uni6n Europeia - Questiones de Derecho Internacional
Privado, XVI Jornadas Nacionales de Derecho Civil, Buenos Aires (1997) (lecture).

2001]

MERCOSUL DISPUTE RESOLUTIONS

State; Article 5 provides for transmittal of rogatory letters;
Articles 19 and 20 provide for extraterritorial effects of
judgments and arbitral awards of the Member States; and
Articles 28 and 31 create mechanisms for information and
consultation among the central authorities charged with
Like similar
transmittal of requests from foreign courts.
agreements of this nature, the Protocol creates a procedural
system with central authorities in the various Member States.
These central authorities are entrusted with receipt and
forwarding of requests for judicial assistance in matters covered
by the agreement. Thus, the body designated as the central
authority is responsible for receipt and processing of the required
measures, as well as for the flow of information between the
court that is to execute the measure and the central authority of
the country that is requesting it." Central authorities also have
authority to remit gratuitously for public purposes a request for
certificates as to matters in civil registries and information about
the law in force."
Procedural guarantees contained in the Protocol of Las
Lefias are not only rules of international judicial assistance, but
are also procedural rules applicable to purely domestic cases.
These guarantees include free access to justice for all citizens and
residents of the Party States." They also include a guarantee of
equality of treatment among parties domiciled in MERCOSUL"
Furthermore, both guarantees apply to legal entities that have
been properly organized, authorized or registered within
MERCOSUL countries.
The Protocol has made the bond requirement of Article 835
of the Brazilian Code of Civil Procedure inapplicable to
Litigants domiciled in any of the
MERCOSUL residents."
44. CODIGO DO MERCOSUL, supra note 1, at 108, 112.
45. Id. at 116-117. See the Inter-American Convention on Rogatory Letters of 1975,
promulgated in Brazil by Decree No. 1899/96 of May 9, 1996, for information pertaining to
rogatory letters. See also Decree No. 2002/96 of Oct. 7, 1996; INTEGRAQAO JURIDICA
INTERAMERICANA, supra note 42, (1998) (analysis of the different Inter-American
Conventions and their impact on Brazilian law).
46. CODIGO DO MERCOSUL, supra note 1, at 109.
47. Id.
48. Article 835 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides:
835. A plaintiff, whether a national or foreigner, who resides outside of Brazil or absents
himself during the pendency of the complaint, shall post a bond sufficient for the costs
and the attorney's fees of the other party... unless he [the plaintiffl has real property in
Brazil to assure payment.
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signatory countries of MERCOSUL are no longer required to post
a bond sufficient to pay the costs and fees of the other party's
lawyer. In a recent decision, the Court of Appeals of the S~o
Paulo Court of Justice confirmed that bond cannot be required
from residents of MERCOSUL countries because of the Las
Lefias Protocol.49
The Protocol of Las Lefias deals with procedures relating to
three types of international jurisdictional cooperation: (1)
rogatory letters for service, notification and taking of evidence;
(2) recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments and arbitral
awards, in which transmittal curiously may be done through
rogatory letters; and (3) furnishing of information on the law
currently in force. The Brazilian Supreme Court has already
utilized the Protocol several times. For example, in a 1997 case
coming from Argentina, the Supreme Court reversed its prior
position of denying exequatur to executory rogatory letters
because of the Protocol of Las Lefias. 0 The Supreme Court
deemed homologation of a rogatory letter as the functional
equivalent of homologation of a foreign judgment. Pursuant to

49. Tribunal of Justice of Sio Paulo, Reporter: Juilio Vidal, headnote: In the terms of
the Protocol of Jurisdictional Cooperation and Assistance in Civil, Commercial, Labor and
Administrative Matters, annexed to Decree 2.067 of 1996, a legal entity whose
headquarters are in a country that is a participant in Mercosul and that brings an action
in national territory is not obligated to post a bond to guarantee cost and attorney's fees
in accordance with Article 835 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for it may not be considered
as a mere foreign firm. One cannot speak of a violation of procedural rules in face of the
constitutional principle, found in Article 5, § 2 of the Federal Constitution, which
safeguards regulatory rules in international treaties to which Brazil is a signatory. AgIn
099.289-4/1, 7th Chamber, Dec. 2, 1998.
50. Agravo Regimental of Rogatory Letter No. 7613, decided by the full STF on April
3, 1997, D.J. of May 9, 1997. The headnote states:
Foreign Judgment: Protocol of Las Lefias; homologation through letter
rogatory. The Protocol of Las Lefias... does not affect the requirement
of every foreign judgment - to which one equates an interlocutory
decision conceding a provisional measure.
In order to become
executable in Brazil, a foreign judgment must be previously submitted
to homologation by the Brazilian Supreme Court, which is an obstacle
to its incidental recognition in the international convention referred
to, when providing in article that homologation (stated as recognition)
of the judgment coming from Party States shall be done through
rogatory letter. This implies permitting the initiative of the judicial
authority.. .in the forum of origin and that exequatur may be
conferred independently by serving the defendant, without prejudice
to later manifestation by the defendant by means of a special form of
appeal [agravo] of the conceding decision or a form of injunction
[embargoes] against its enforcement.
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Article 19 of the Protocol,5 1 a foreign court can send a rogatory
letter via the Central Authority for transmittal to the Supreme
Court of a request for homologation of its judgment. Adhering to
the opinion of the Federal Public Ministry, the Brazilian
Supreme Court determined that the Protocol simplified the
homologation procedure provided for in Articles 218, et seq. of its
The Supreme Court interpreted the term
Internal Rules.
"recognition" used in Article 19 of the Protocol to mean the
procedure for homologation of a foreign judgment, as regulated
by Brazilian law. This understanding was also based upon its
reading of the subsequent articles of the Protocol. In defining the
requirements for recognition, these articles set out requirements
for concession of exequatur without substantial innovations.
The Supreme Court recognized that the wording of the
Protocol does not clarify its recognition proceeding for execution
of the rogatory letter. In view of the Brazilian Constitution,
which grants to the Supreme Court original jurisdiction to
homologate foreign judgments and to concede exequatur to
rogatory letters, it is difficult to conceive of the Supreme Court
accepting recognition through rogatory letter.52 Because
homologation under Brazilian law has a constitutional
dimension, a Protocol cannot dispense with it. Nevertheless, this
innovation, as noted by Minister Sepilveda Pertence, is
significant because it creates a new, more direct path for
recognition of judgments coming from the countries that are
parties to MERCOSUL. Under this new system, judgments are
sent directly and no longer depend upon the initiative of the
parties. Thus, the Protocol created a means to facilitate
homologation by rogatory letter."
51. Art. 19 of the Protocol ofLas Lefias provides:
"Request for recognition and enforcement of judgments and arbitral awards by judicial
authorities shall be transmitted by way of rogatory letter through the Central Authority."

52. Constituicao Federal, art. 102(h) (1988). Unlike other civil law countries, where
exequatur refers to confirmation of foreign judgments, in

Brazil exequatur refers

exclusively to the order issued by the President of the STF directing the lower courts to
perform rogatory letters.

Homologation is the term used for recognition of a foreign

judgment by the President of the STF.
53. This position was consolidated in another rogatory letter case, also stemming
from Argentina, Ag. Reg. in Rogatory Letter No. 7618, Apr. 3, 1997. The Supreme Court's
headnote stated:
The Protocol of Las Lefias... does not affect the requirement that
every foreign judgment - to which one equates an interlocutory
decision conceding a preventive measure - has to be previously
submitted for homologation to the Supreme Court in order to become
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Foreign judgments may now be homologated in Brazil in two
ways. If entered by a court in a MERCOSUL country, the
judgment will go directly to the Brazilian Supreme Court for
exequatur of the rogatory letter itself. If entered by a court in a
non-MERCOSUL country, the prevailing party must seek
homologation of the judgment from the President of the Supreme
Court.54 This signifies the effective creation of a more rapid
channel for decisions stemming from the member countries of
MERCOSUL.
The Protocol provides for authentic homologation, externally
dressed in the form of a rogatory letter transmitted through the
Central Authority. The significant innovation is that recognition
and execution are done in a single transmittal initiated by the
requesting Central Authority. This must be communicated to the
requested Central Authority. Unlike other countries, where
rogatory letters are determined by judges of the first instance,
Brazil still requires that its Supreme Court decide whether to
honor the foreign court's request. The time has come for the
Supreme Court to stop deciding whether to permit the lower
courts to comply with rogatory letters. However, in the proposed
constitutional amendment for judicial reform currently before
Congress, this change has not been adopted.
Instead, the
proposed amendment will transfer jurisdiction to decide whether
to comply with rogatory letters and to recognize foreign
judgments from the Supreme Court to the Superior Tribunal of
Justice (STJ). This reform already has the support of the
President of the STF."
If this amendment is adopted, the

enforceable in Brazil. This is an obstacle to its submission for
incidental recognition in Brazilian courts by the judge asked to order
its execution. The international convention, however, created an
innovation, providing in Article 19 that homologation (recognition) of a
judgment coming from Party States may be done via a rogatory letter.
This implies permitting the initiative of the competent judicial
authority in the forum of origin and that exequatur be independent of
the service on the requested party, without prejudice to later
manifestation by the requested party by means of an appeal (agravo)
of the decision or attachment for its execution.
More recently, other cases were decided in the same way. See Rogatory Letter No. 8267,
Mar. 5, 2000 (rogatory letter from Argentina came with a divorce decree and was
homologated under the rules of the Las Lefias Protocol).
54. See SERGIO MOURAO CORREA LIMA, TRATADOS INTERNACIONAIS NO
BRASIL E INTEGRAQAO 152 (1998), for homolgation procedures.

55. CARLOS MARIO DA SILVA VELLOSO, TEMAS DE DIREITO POBLICO 117
(2d ed. 1997) ("There is no reason to justify the jurisdiction of a Constitutional Court in
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proceedings will continue to be centralized in Brasilia in the
penultimate federal appellate court.
The traditional position continues in force. Recently, the
STF reaffirmed its traditional jurisdiction when a lower court
granted immediate performance of a rogatory letter from
Uruguay, relying upon the Protocol of Las Lefias. The STF
reversed on appeal, making it clear that only the STF had the
power to decide whether to execute a rogatory letter from a
This understanding, which confers absolute
foreign court.6
hierarchical, normative precedence to jurisdictional allocations in
the Federal Constitution despite international treaties and
agreements celebrated by Brazil, has prevailed as much in the
doctrine as in the case law of the Supreme Court."
Another area in which there has been a significant change is
acceptance of rogatory letters of an executory character coming
the case. Homologation of a foreign judgment seldom provokes any constitutional
discussion. The questions raised are, as a rule, matters of procedural law. The same
thing may be said with respect to the concession of exequatur for rogatory letters.
Therefore, this jurisdiction should be with the STJ.").
56. Reclamation No. 717, Dec. 20, 1997. The Reporter: Minister Celso de Mello,
wrote:
This deals with a reclamation formulated against the act of a law of
the District of Santana do LivramentoRS. Having allegedly conceded
exequatur to a rogatory letter sent directly by.. .Judge de Rivera of
Uruguay, the judge usurped the jurisdiction of the President of the
Federal Supreme Tribunal.. .whose powers include that of
determining execution in Brazilian territory of.. .rogatory letters
directed to the Brazilian judiciary. The state judge from Rio Grande
do Sul had invoked the Protocol of Las Lefias as the legal basis
authorizing his decision.
In this case, the act impugned clearly invades the sphere of original
and single judge jurisdiction of the President of the Federal Supreme
Tribunal, to whom it is incumbent upon, in the terms of Article 102(h),
and 102(i), of the Constitution, to homologate foreign judgments and
to concede exequatur to rogatory letters emanating from judicial
authorities in other countries.
The Protocol of Las Lefias in no way changed this constitutional rule of jurisdiction. In
our legal system acts of public international law, such as treaties or international
conventions, are subject to the supremacy and the normative authority of the Constitution
of the Republic.
57. PONTES DE MIRANDA, 4 COMENTARIOS A CONSTITUIIAO DE 1967 COM
A EMENDA NO. 1 DE 1969, 146, No. 35 (2d ed. 1974); JOSI9 FRANCISCO REZEK,
DIREITO DOS TRATADOS 462-463 (1984); GILMAR FERREIRA MENDES,
JURISDIQAO CONSTITUCIONAL 155, 168 (1996); CLIMERSON MERLIN CLEVE, A
NO
DIREITO
CONSTITUCIONALIDADE
DE
ABSTRATA
FISCALIZA(AO
BRASILEIRO 142 (1995); ANTONIO PAULO CACHAPUZ DE MEDEIROS, 0 PODER
DE CELEBRAR TRATADOS 277 (1995); ADIn 1.480-DF, Reporter: Minister Celso de
Mello, 84 R.T. 724; Reporter: Minister Djaci Falcdo, 121 R.T. 270-276.
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from MERCOSUL countries." Until the Protocol of Las Lefias,
the case law of the STF repeatedly denied exequatur to rogatory
letters that were not merely procedural steps. Even after signing
the Protocol of Las Lefias, but prior to its entry into force, the
STF summarily rejected a rogatory letter from Argentina. 9
Subsequently, CR 7.613, a decision discussed supra,modified
this understanding and accepted an executory rogatory letter
because of the Protocol of Las Lefias. The Supreme Court,
however, has refused to modify its traditional case law position
for executory rogatory letters from non-MERCOSUL countries.
In a case involving a rogatory letter of an executory nature
issued by an Italian court, the STF made it plain that its position
has been modified only when treaties and international
agreements on international judicial cooperation with an express
provision on this matter are in force in Brazil."
58. Under the Brazilian system all rogatory letters received from abroad are
processed by the STF as matters of original jurisdiction, defined in the Federal
Constitution. For outbound rogatory letters, however, the procedure is simpler. The
judge may send them directly to the requested country, which will then process them in
accordance with its own law. See PET-15/RS, Reporter: Minister Celso de Mello,
10.30.1997. D.J. 11.6.1997. The headnote states:
Order: The state judge of the first instance sent a rogatory letter to the
President of the Supreme Federal Tribunal requesting that a judge in
the Federal Republic of Germany, serve the defendant in a traditional
proceeding of a civil nature. The measure was requested by the
illustrious Brazilian magistrate, supported as a typical active rogatory
commission. Nothing in it includes the jurisdictional powers of the
Supreme Federal Tribunal, whose original jurisdiction in the matter is
restricted solely to passive rogatory letters, which means those
directed by foreign judiciaries to the Brazilian judiciary.
59. Rogatory Letter No. 7128, Dec. 13, 1995. The STF relied on the following opinion
of the Federal Public Ministry:
The present rogatory letter has the purpose of registry of a pledge
decreed on real property specified in the text of the rogatory letter.
This measure, which has a purely executory character, makes
concession of the exequatur non-viable in terms of the case law of the
Supreme Court. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the exequatur
should be denied and the letter returned to the court of origin.
Minister Sepulveda Pertence's short opinion then stated: "I accept the opinion. See CR
3.237, 95 R.T.J. 46; CR 5.705, CR 5.707 and CR 5.715, D.J.U 8.30.1991; CR 6.957 and CR
6.958, D.J.U. 3.7.1995; CR 6.779, D.J.U 3.13.1995; CR 6.681, D.J.U 4.6.1995, which refuse
to grant rogatory letters that are of executory character, I deny exequatur."
60. Reporter: Minister Celso de Mello, 02.19.1998, D.J.U. 03.04.1998, p. 00010,
which stated:
Order: Contrary to what has been suggested by the learned Procurator
General of the Republic.. .it is not viable to recognize in the case as a
rogatory letter the instrument set out in pages 3-7 for the effect of the
procedure requested. This deals with judicial request of an executory
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Supreme Court case law in this area of executory measures
is still changing. Although the above decision said it would grant
an executory rogatory letter if a convention exists, in Rogatory
Letter No. 9024,61 exequatur was denied because an Argentine
court requested the breaching of bank secrecy, a measure that
can only be allowed in Brazil by a specific court order. Curiously,
the Protocol of Las Lefias was not mentioned.
Nonetheless, it appears that the Supreme Court has changed
its position. In more recent decisions, the STF has utilized the
Protocol of Provisional Measures in addition to the Protocol of
Las Leflas. In Rogatory Letter No. 8240, the Supreme Court
decided that a measure requiring the apprehension of a minor,
held by his father in Brazil, in accordance with an order rendered
by an Argentine court, should be granted. 2 Also, in Rogatory
Letter No. 9194, a motion granted by an Argentine court to
inform the Real Property Registry of a pledge on certain property
for purposes of execution was granted by the Supreme Court. 3
Progress is being made in using the Protocol of Las Leflas to
hasten recognition of foreign decisions through the use of
rogatory letters. Even though the status of provisional measures
is still unclear, they can be accepted through the use of the
Provisional Measures Protocol, as in the case cited above.
Presently, two systems are in force in the Supreme Court
with respect to rogatory letters: the traditional system and a
simplified system applicable only to cases coming from
MERCOSUL or countries with which Brazil has a judicial
assistance treaty or convention in force.
Rogatory letters
received by the Brazilian courts must still pass through the filter
of the STF. Rogatory letters issued by Brazilian courts, however,
are governed by the law of the country to which the requests are
sent, and the Brazilian judge must direct the rogatory letter
directly to the proper court or other authority in that country.
There is growing uncertainty about the rules that are in
character, which can only be adhered to at the place where
enforcement of the rogatory letter is requested, if it has been expressly
consented to a treaty of judicial cooperation in civil matters, which
although signed between Brazil and Italy in 1989, has been in force in
Brazil only since its promulgation by Decree No. 1476 of May 2, 1995.
61. Letter Rogatory No. 9024, (Dec. 2, 1991).
62. Letter Rogatory No. 8240, (Nov. 16, 1998).
63. Letter Rogatory No. 9194, (June 6, 2000).
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force and applicable in a determined country with respect to
proof of and information about foreign law. More effective
mechanisms are needed to enable courts to determine what are
the relevant rules of foreign law. The Protocol of Las Lefias
imposed upon Central Authorities the duty to report on the law
in force.64 This obligation was extended to diplomatic and
consular authorities, through the jurisdiction of the party State.'
It would be better, however, if this obligation were extended to
private parties, considering the burden of proving any foreign
law they allege.' Each Member State has agreed to full and
reciprocal collaboration in helping the courts of other Member
States determine its own law at no expense, always respecting
public policy,67 and without any of the parties being bound by the
information rendered or received, especially if the subject of the
information refers to the meaning or reach of a legal rule. 8
Considering the peculiarities of official information of this order
established by the Protocol, the judge is not obligated to apply
the law in conformity with the response received, nor is the State
Party that furnishes the information obliged to apply its own law
64. C6DIGO DO MERCOSUL, supra note 1, at 117.
65. Id. Although many do not consider this Protocol as a modality for international
judicial cooperation, the information on foreign law is an important element for the
development of international juridical relations. Extraterritorial application of law leads
to difficulties in determining what is the law in force and applicable to the concrete case
in a foreign country. In Brazil, the Law of the Introduction to the Civil Code deals with
the possibility of the extraterritorial application of the law. The Brazilian legislature,
following the German model, concentrated in an introductory set of provisions to the Civil
Code, the principal rules of private international law in force in our legal system. This
introduction provides for various hypotheses for application of foreign law by Brazilian
judges when there is a conflict of laws with respect to transnational litigation.
66. Article 14 of the Law of Introduction to the Civil Code provides that when the
judge is not familiar with foreign law, he may require the party who alleges it to prove its
text and that it is in force. Article 337 of the Code of Civil Procedure contains the same
requirement. Article 401 of the Bustamante Code provides that proof of the law in force
in a determined country be done by means of certification by two lawyers in practice
therein.
67. It is difficult to conceive of any situation in which the rendering of information
about positive law in force in a country could possibly offend public policy. Similarly, it
does not seem possible that application of positive rules of law of a State by the judge of
another State may in any manner be contrary to public policy of the first State, no matter
how immoral the foreign proceedings may seem in the application of such rules. There is
no situation in which a State can revoke its current law except by its own legislation or its
own judiciary. Similarly, there is no situation in which there could be a violation of public
order in concealing information in that respect.
68. The text of Article 30 of the Protocol contains an obvious error: it provides "the
meaning of the legal reach of its law." What it refers to is the meaning and the legal
reach, the hermeneutic exegesis of the rule.
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as reported6 9
In fact, the Central Authority that does the
reporting may not definitively announce a theory of law in force
that in any way binds other organs of the government. On the
other hand, the court that requests the information in no way
loses its power or duty to say what the law is, even when that
law is foreign law. The option followed by the Protocol properly
made the Central Authority an organ for communication of
positive law without conferring on it the power to certify that a
determined rule is in force.7"
c. Binding Arbitration
Independently of whether private parties present their
disputes to organs of MERCOSUL or to a national judiciary, they
may still resort to private arbitration.
Arbitration as an
alternative resolution mechanism for MERCOSUL state to state
disputes is clearly contemplated in the system elected by the
Protocol of Brasilia.
Brazilian law has had two recent modifications with respect
to arbitration. One was adoption of a new Arbitration Law, Law
No. 9.307 of September 23, 1996, which not only makes domestic
arbitration more efficacious, but also makes it easier to enforce
foreign arbitral awards in Brazil. Second, Brazil has ratified the
Inter-American Convention on Commercial Arbitration, which is
similar in many respects to the 1958 New York Convention71on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.

69. CODIGO DO MERCOSUL, supra note 1, at 117.
70. See Nadia Araujo, Ricardo Ramalho Almeida, & Carlos Alberto Salles,
Coopera do Interjurisdicional no Mercosul, in MERCOSUL (Maristela Basso ed., 2d ed.
1998), for a comparison of the Protocol of Las Lefias with the Inter-American Conventions
with respect to this question.
71. The Inter-American Convention, published in the Digrio Oficial of the Union on
Sept. 24, 1996, Section I, pgs. 18.897 to 18.900, gives great weight to the autonomy of the
parties. It confers ample liberty upon them to choose the applicable rules, be they
procedural or substantive. It also permits them to opt for decision of any disputes in
accordance with the uses and customs of international commerce. The compromise
became, in addition to autonomy with respect to the principal contract, a factor for
exclusion of state jurisdiction so long as the parties retained recourse to the judiciary by
way of an action itself, provided for in Article 7 of the law. The Inter-American
Convention on International Commercial Arbitration was promulgated by Decree No.
1902 of 1996, published in the DO of May 10, 1996. See Lauro Gama e Sousa, Jr., A
Convengtxo Interamericanasobre Arbitragem Comercial Internacional, in INTEGRAQAO
JURIDICA INTERAMERICANA, supra note 42, for analysis of this Convention.
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Chapter VI, Articles 34-40 of the Arbitration Law, deals with
recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. Article
35 substantially facilitates recognition of foreign arbitral awards
by eliminating a requirement in prior legislation that every
foreign arbitral award be reduced to judgment in the place where
it was rendered and then homologated in the STF. Now the
foreign arbitral award can be presented directly to the STF for
This reform eliminated an expensive, timehomologation.
consuming and unnecessary step in the country where the award
was rendered.72
Brazil's adoption of this modern Arbitration Law reflects
important progress in the country's quest for universal access of
justice.73 This represents a consistent response to the world
tendency towards facilitation of the international extension of the
effects of judgments or arbitral awards,7 a movement that
The new law attempts to
directly affects MERCOSUL.
modernize domestic arbitration in order to make it easier to
recognize and execute foreign arbitral awards. If the losing party
fails to comply with a definitive arbitral award, the prevailing
party has the right to request judicial recognition and execution
of the decision.
Unfortunately, the constitutionality of the new Arbitration
Law has been placed under a cloud by a pending confirmation
action in the Brazilian Supreme Court. In 1995, the prevailing
party requested homologation in Brazil of a foreign arbitral
award without its having been reduced to judgment in the
The Brazilian party
country where the award was issued.
resisted recognition claiming that Article 35 of the Arbitration
Law, which dispensed with the need to reduce the award to
The Reporter, Minister
judgment, was unconstitutional.
Sepdilveda Pertence, rejected that contention and voted to

72. See ARBITRAGEM, A NOVA LEI BRASILEIRA E A PRAXE INTERNACIONAL
(Paulo Borda Casella ed., 1997) (particularly Lauro de Gama e Souza, Jr., Reconhecimento
e Execugdo de Senten~asArbitraisEstrangeiras309-324 and Andr6 de Carvalho Ramos, 0
Reconhecimento de Senten~a Arbitral Estrangeira e a Cooperagdo Jurisdicional no
Mercosul).
73. Mauro Cappelletti, Os Metodos Alternativos de Soluqdo de Conflitos no Quadro
do Movimento universal de Acesso e Justiqa, 326 REVISTA FORENSE 121-130
(translation of Jose Carlos Barbosa Moreira).
74. See Jos6 Carlos Barbosa Moreira, Problemas e Soluqes em Matdria de
Reconhecimento e Execuqto de Senten as e Laudos Arbitrais Estrangeiros, in TEMAS DE
DIREITO PROCESSUAL 243-290 (4th ed. 1989).
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recognize the award.
However, sua sponte, he declared
unconstitutional Article 6 and all of Article 7 of the new
Arbitration Law. These provisions permit judicial enforcement of
an agreement to arbitrate disputes in advance of their arising.
Making agreements to arbitrate future disputes specifically
enforceable was deemed unconstitutional upon the dubious
theory that it violated the right to access to justice. This issue
was unrelated to the merits of the dispute. 5
In a recent case, Minister Mauricio Corr~a, in his vote to
homologate an arbitral award from the United Kingdom without
need for reducing it to judgment, went out of his way to disagree
with the decision taken by Minister Sepdlveda Pertence and
declared that the Arbitration Law was not unconstitutional
because it did not deny anyone access to justice."6 Neither vote
has been finalized by the Brazilian Supreme Court, which is still
studying the question. For the time being, the constitutionality
of the Arbitration Law is still in doubt.7" Hopefully, this issue
will soon be resolved by the STF. In the meantime, old doubts
about the institution of arbitration have returned and have
complicated the lives of those who would like to utilize it.
None of these Brazilian problems with arbitration has
troubled MERCOSUL, which provides for arbitration for the
resolution of disputes, both for institutional and private levels. A
Protocol was recently approved on arbitration, but it has not yet
entered into force domestically.
This Protocol reaffirms
arbitration as the means of resolving immigration disputes in the
Southern Cone."8
75. Vote of Minister Sepdlveda Pertence, S.E. No. 5206 of May 8, 1997.
76. S.E. No. 5847-1 - United Kingdom, vote of May 20, 1999.
77. These decisions and their implications are analyzed in more detail in Arnoldo
Wald, Patrick Schellenberg & Keith S. Rosenn, Some Controversial Aspects of the New
BrazilianArbitrationLaw, 31 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 223 (2000).
78. See MERCOSUR, RMJ/Acuerdo 1198: Acuerdo sobre arbitraje comercial
internacional del Mercosur. The preamble of this accord states:
Reaffirming the desire of the Member States of MERCOSUR to find
common legal solutions for strengthening the process of integration of
MERCOSUR, setting forth the necessity for according the private
sector of the Member States of MERCOSUR alternative methods for
resolution of disputes arising from international commercial contracts
entered into between individuals or legal entities of private law;
Convinced of the necessity of making uniform the organization and
functioning of international arbitration in the Member States to
contribute to the expansion of regional and international trade;
Desirous of promoting and granting incentives to the extrajudicial
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Curiously, until 1999, none of the numerous trade disputes
among MERCOSUL countries were resolved by arbitration. Only

in 1999, were the first two arbitrations under MERCOSUL, both
involving Brazil and Argentina, decided.79 In the beginning of
2000, a third dispute between the same two countries was
resolved by arbitration.'0 There, however, have been numerous
disputes among the MERCOSUL countries that have never been

resolved

by MERCOSUL

dispute

resolution

mechanisms.'

Indeed, the series of trade disputes between Argentina and
Brazil in the wake of Brazil's January 1999 devaluation have
been primarily handled by direct presidential negotiations rather

than the formal dispute resolution mechanisms established
under MERCOSUL.
The inability to resolve this series of
disputes successfully by that route underscores the institutional
fragility of MERCOSUL and makes clear the need for a Court of
Justice and a common currency.
solution of private disputes by means of arbitration in MERCOSUR, a
practice that is in accordance with the peculiarities of international
transactions;
Considering that protocols were approved in MERCOSUR that provide
for the election of arbitration and the recognition and execution of
foreign arbitral awards and judgments;
Taking into account the Inter-American Convention on International
Commercial Arbitration of January 30, 1975, concluded in the city of
Panamt, the Inter-American Convention on the Extraterritorial
Effects of Foreign Arbitral Judgments and Awards of May 8, 1979,
concluded in Montevideo, and the Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration of the United Nations Commission for
International Commercial Law of June 21, 1985;
Article I Purnose
The present accord has as its regular object the arbitration as an
alternative private means for solution of controversies stemming from
international commercial contracts between individuals or legal
entities of private law. ....
Article 23 Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
For enforcement of a foreign arbitral award one shall apply, where
pertinent, the provisions of the Inter-American Convention on
International Commercial Arbitration of Panami of 1975; the Protocol
for Jurisdictional Cooperation and Assistance in Civil, Commercial,
Labor and Administrative matters of MERCOSUL, approved by the
decision of the Council of the Common Market No. 5192, and the
Inter-American Convention on the Extraterritorial Effects of Foreign
Arbitral Judgments and Awards of Montevideo of 1979.
79. See supra note 37.
80. Id.
81. See David Lopez, Dispute Resolution under MERCOSUR from 1991 to 1996:
Implications for the Formationof a Free TradeArea of the Americas, 3 NAFTA. L. & BUS.
REV. AM. 3, 22-27 (1997).
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V. CONCLUSION

MERCOSUL, contrary to the European Community, does not
have a system that guarantees uniformity of decisions for the
solution of disputes stemming from the rules created by the
process of integration. On the contrary, the three means that
have been discussed are superimposed on each other and can all
be utilized at the same time without any specific criteria.
MERCOSUL also does not have an effective means for the
control of the legality of the acts of community institutions. It
lacks a supranational institution with powers to enforce its rule.
To a limited extent, this function is today exercised by the
judiciaries of the Member States under their domestic legislation.
This does not, however, assure uniformity in interpretation and
application of community rules. The incorporation of community
acts into domestic legal orders is still done in accordance with
rules of classic international law and the pertinent rules of
domestic law. Community rules enter into force only after
legislative approval and executive promulgation in each of the
countries of MERCOSUL. Hence, resolution of controversies is
at sea, depending upon the initiative of the interested or
prejudiced parties. Lack of a uniform system for resolution of
these disputes provides a futile ground for forum shopping.
On the positive side, the experience of the CCM, resulting
from an empirical analysis of its published consultations, has
been satisfactory and has usually avoided the need to resort to
arbitration. The experience of the CCM, which needs more
profound study, indicates that it is a useful forum for direct
negotiations to resolve community differences amicably. Often
the Member States have reached agreements that have benefited
private parties, since the cost of the consultations are borne by
the governments themselves.
In the great bulk of cases,
agreements have been reached in a short period of time because
of the specialization of the agents involved and the practice of
directing the consultations to the domestic, governmental organs
responsible for regulation of the questioned activities.
The non-existence of many lawsuits in Brazil involving
questions of MERCOSUL rules is attributable to three factors:
(1) the high costs of transnational litigation, (2) the uncertainty
about the likely result due to the judiciary's lack of information
on communitarian questions and the specificity of transnational
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litigation, and (3) lack of confidence in utilization of arbitration
by lawyers and magistrates." In addition to these transmittal
problems, one must consider the notoriously long delays in
resolving legal disputes in the Brazilian courts."
MERCOSUL has not reached a satisfactory solution for
transnational dispute resolutions. This requires a supranational
tribunal for dispute resolution whose decisions can be executed
without great problems in the member countries. Today this is
not possible due to the peculiarities of the constitutional system
of Brazil. This situation is not likely to change, as can be seen in
the proposed Brazilian Constitutional Amendment for Judiciary
Reform, currently under way in Congress, which does not
attempt to change any of these issues.
Another solution would be the creation of mechanisms of
cooperation among the judiciaries to deal with these questions
and to guarantee uniformity in the application of community law
and in resolving transnational questions. One positive aspect is
the current use and interpretation by the Supreme Court of the
Protocol of Las Lefias and the Protocol of Provisional Measures,
signaling that Brazil's highest court is sensitive to MERCOSUL's
needs of fast judicial response in transnational cases. While
there is no uniformity among member countries in dealing with
the issues of transnational litigation, Brazil has changed its prior
position and has opened a special path for MERCOSUL cases.

82. This field of law is in full expansion and highly technical, as demonstrated by
analysis of the case law of the European Court, which for the most part has dealt with
problems relating to competition.
83. See Keith S. Rosenn, JudicialReform in Brazil, 4 NAFTA: L. & BUS. REV. AM.
19, 29-31 (1998); Carlos Mniio da Silva Velloso, Do Poder Judicidrio:Como Tornd-lo mais
Agil e Dindmico. Efeito Vinculanate e Outros Temas, 35 REV. INFORM. LEGIS. 75-87
(No. 138, 1998).

